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This paper examines how motivation, crowding and social image affect environmental conservation
decisions. An artefactual ﬁeld experiment conducted in Bolivia is used to reproduce the trade-off between
individual and social beneﬁts in natural resource use and test the effect of non-monetary and non-regulatory
incentives on pro-social behavior for environmental conservation. The results show the presence of a social
norm prescribing positive contribution towards environmental protection, and that external incentives have
heterogeneous effects on pro-social behavior depending on how they inﬂuence reputation and self-image.
The experimental results differ from those of analogous experiments conducted in the laboratory, and are
instead consistent with those from ﬁeld experiments on common-pool resource management. This fact
suggests caution in generalizing conclusions, reached in the laboratory, to different settings and populations.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Common-pool resources (CPR) are characterized by non-exclud-
ability and rivalry in consumption. The difﬁculty of excluding
individuals from use and the fact that consumption by one individual
reduces the amount of resource available to others imply that CPR
users face a typical cooperation dilemma. Each individual depends on
the resource for her livelihood and has the incentive to maximize her
own beneﬁt by increasing extraction. However, if everyone follows
the same rationale, the resourcewill be depleted andwill not generate
beneﬁts for anyone in the long term. In an inﬂuential article, Hardin
(1968) claims that the behavior of rational, self-interested individuals
is bound to result in overexploitation of CPR. This conclusion is
consistent with game theoretical predictions and is conﬁrmed by
numerous examples of overharvesting of renewable natural re-
sources, such as ﬁsheries, forests and groundwater.
Solutions to the cooperation dilemma have focused on the
establishment of external regulations for extraction, property rights
to the resource or, more recently, payment for environmental services
schemes. These interventions assume that individuals are rational and
self-interested. However, research on CPRmanagement questions this
vision, by offering evidence of effective cooperation to solve commons
problems. Field experiments show that collective action is most
effective when communities are able to self-organize, design and
enforce their own rules (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990;
Wade, 1986). Other studies report cases in which changes from a
system of self-governance to one of external regulation generate a
shift from community norms of cooperation to selﬁsh strategies of
extraction (Ostrom, 2006; Vatn, 2006).
One explanation for the failure of external interventions on the
sustainability of CPR management is that these measures crowd-out
intrinsic motivation, leading to a change in behavior among
community members. Individuals may engage in conservation of
CPR because they think it is important or because they feel a moral
duty to do so. If this is the case, the introduction of external
regulations or incentives can change people's perception of the
behavior. Voluntary goodwill is turned into a market-like interaction,
resulting in fewer people willing to sacriﬁce for the common good.
Benabou and Tirole (2006) argue that motivation crowding acts
through the effect of external incentives on individual social and self-
image. By lowering the value of pro-social choices as signals of one's
own moral qualities, external incentives can crowd-out individuals'
intrinsic motivation to behave pro-socially. The empirical relevance of
the crowding-out effect is conﬁrmed by a number of studies, starting
from Titmuss' (1970) seminal contribution on blood donation. Field
experiments show that pro-social behavior decreases after the
introduction of monetary rewards (Frey et al., 1996; Frey and Götte,
1999) and that the crowding-out effect is heterogeneous across
individuals (Charness and Gneezy, 2009).
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This study uses an artefactual ﬁeld experiment on CPR conserva-
tion to explore two under-researched issues in the literature on
crowding-out. The ﬁrst is the effect of non-monetary and non-
regulatory external incentives on motivation crowding in a ﬁeld
setting. The second is the heterogeneity of motivation crowding
effects depending on individuals' intrinsic motivation. This topic is
best explored using anartefactual ﬁeld experiment as methodological
tool. This type of experiment selects its participant pool from actual
users of the natural resource and confronts participants with a natural
task, reﬂecting the trade-off between individual short-term and social
long-term beneﬁts that they face in their daily use of the CPR.1 Survey
data complement the experimental results, whichmakes it possible to
examine the effect of cultural, social and other contextual factors on
individual behavior.
The experiment was conducted in two rural villages in the South-
East of Bolivia, with users of forest and groundwater resources. The
experimental choice was that of contributing to the conservation of
these CPR. By donating part of their endowment, participants could
ﬁnance the purchase and planting of trees around the water source
and thus increase the future social beneﬁts from CPR. The design
introduced external incentives to donate, in the form of priming for
socially approved behavior. The empirical analysis investigates
whether the effect of priming differs depending on participants'
intrinsic motivation, captured by their level of civic engagement and
individualism. The data analysis also examines whether motivation
crowding acts through the effect of incentives on social or self-image,
by exploiting the public nature of choice under one experimental
treatment and existing relationships between participants observing
each other's choices.
On average, participants contribute a positive amount, around
two-ﬁfth of their endowment. This result is consistent with the
presence of a social norm of cooperation for the conservation of CPR.
All treatments have a positive effect on contributions to the
reforestation project by individualistic participants. On the contrary,
civically engaged individuals appear less sensitive to the priming
embodied in the experimental treatments. When decisions are
private, individuals who belong to the same family or community
associations give similar amounts. When decisions are public, the
amounts donated by members of the same family are more diverse,
while those donated bymembers of the same community associations
are still homogeneous. The different effect on observable and
unobservable choices of sharing a social link in the public rather
than in the private sphere is interpreted as evidence of the role of
social image on pro-social behavior.
The next section examines relevant contributions in the literature
on crowding-out and CPR management and presents testable pre-
dictions. Section 3 describes the setting and design of the study. The
experimental results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes
with some policy implications for the design of CPR interventions.
2. Literature and Behavioral Predictions
According to Frey and Stutzer (2006), three conditions increase
the probability that external incentives lead to crowding-out of pro-
social behavior. Crowding-out is more likely to occur if incentives are
perceived as restrictive and controlling; if they reduce the degree of
individual self-determination; and if the setting in which they are
introduced is one where norms of cooperation and reciprocity are in
place. In this section, I will present theoretical contributions and
empirical evidence in support of these claims, focusing in particular
on experimental studies that show these effects at work in the realm
of CPR management.
A number of theoretical studies model the mechanisms behind
motivation-crowding effects. Two main approaches are used. In the
ﬁrst, external incentives affect intrinsic motivation by changing
preferences (Frey, 1994). The second approach models external
interventions as changing the perceived nature of a task, the task
environment or the agent's self-perception, and through these
channels inﬂuence the motivation to perform the task. Benabou and
Tirole (2006) claim that external incentives affect intrinsic motivation
to behave altruistically by lowering the signaling value of pro-social
choices. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) also formalize the
damaging effect on morale of pecuniary incentives and control
systems.
Frey and Jegen (2002) offer a review of motivation crowding
theory, where they discuss two psychological processes behind the
effect of external incentives on intrinsic motivation. The ﬁrst process
focuses on self-determination: external interventions perceived to
impair self-determination, reduce intrinsic motivation by replacing it
with external control. The second channel focuses on self-esteem: an
agent's intrinsic motivation is rejected by interventions that do not
acknowledge her involvement and competence. Intrinsically moti-
vated individuals are deprived of their chance of showing their
involvement in an activity when someone offers a reward or orders
them to do it (Frey and Jegen, 2002).
Monetary sanctions and restrictive regulatory systems have been
shown to lead to lower levels of pro-social behavior in a wide range of
settings. In a ﬁeld experiment, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) look at
the introduction of ﬁnes for parents who arrive late to pick-up their
kids from a day-care center. Introducing the ﬁnes leads to an increase
in late arrivals by parents. Even after the removal of the ﬁne, the initial
level of cooperation by parents cannot be reached anymore. In a
laboratory experiment, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) show that similar
crowding-out effects are produced by the introduction of regulations
restricting participants' choice set in a principal-agent relationship.
The existing literature also demonstrates how the crowding-out
effect is heterogeneous depending on individual level of intrinsic
motivation. Charness and Gneezy (2009) conduct a ﬁeld experiment
in which they introduce monetary incentives to encourage people to
exercise. The incentives have a different impact on gym attendance
depending on its level before the introduction of the reward: a
positive one on non-regular attendees, and a negligible, and negative,
one on individuals who previously attended the gym regularly. The
crowding-in effect of incentives prevails for individuals with low
intrinsic motivation, while this effect is absent, or even reversed, for
highly motivated subjects.
In the ﬁeld of CPR management, a large number of artefactual
experiments focus on the effect of the introduction of regulation by an
external authority. When sanctions are imposed without negotiation
with resource users they cause crowding-out by undermining self-
determination and shifting responsibility away from users to an
outside entity (Cardenas et al., 2000; Ostmann et al., 1997).
Experiments show that giving CPR users the possibility to decide
over rules increases the efﬁciency of the management system. Being
allowed to vote for sanctions fosters cooperation (Vyrastekova and
van Soest, 2003), as does the introduction of enabling rather than
controlling interventions (Vollan, 2008). Both in laboratory and ﬁeld
settings, introducing the possibility of face-to-face communication
reduce the level of CPR extraction (Cardenas, 2000; Ostrom and
Walker, 1991). Finally, settings where both rule formation and
sanctioning are decentralized lead to CPR usage close to the social
optimum (Ostrom et al., 1992).
In some cases, external incentives can crowd-in pro-social
behavior. A large number of conventional experiments, i.e. experi-
ments conducted in the laboratory with student samples, show that
priming on the socially approved behavior has a positive effect on
altruism. Increasing observability of choices and reducing social
distance among participants generate higher average contributions in
1 For a discussion of different types of experiments used in CPR research, see
Anderies et al. (2011).
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dictator games (Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Hoffman et al., 1996), as does
observing others behaving altruistically and focusing one's attention
on the existence of a norm (Krupka and Weber, 2009). The
introduction of decentralized costly punishment increases investment
in the common project in public good games (Fehr and Gaechter,
2000). Crowding-in is more rarely observed in ﬁeld settings and CPR
artefactual experiments. Castillo and Saysel (2005) show that external
regulation triggers higher cooperation levels among ﬁshermen on a
Caribbean island, while Rodriguez-Sickert et al. (2008) ﬁnd that
increasing sanctions and enforcement probability eventually yields to
cooperation levels close to those under self-governing systems.
Artefactual and conventional experiments yield different pre-
dictions on the effect of external incentives on intrinsic motivation to
behave pro-socially: a negative effect in the former set of studies and a
positive one in the latter. This difference may be due to the different
types of incentives analyzed by the two streams of literature.
Regulatory and monetary incentives are the main focus of ﬁeld
experiments on CPR management, while non-monetary and non-
regulatory factors, such as priming, are generally studied in laboratory
studies on norms compliance. Regulations and monetary rewards are
likely to be perceived as controlling and lead to crowding-out,
according to Frey and Stutzer's (2006) theory. More subtle incentives,
such as those used in priming, are less likely to trigger such reaction.
The positive effect of priming on norm compliance has rarely been
tested in the context of CPR management. The present study aims to
ﬁll this gap.
The difference between the conclusions reached by conventional
and artefactual experiments may also depend on the fact that the two
sets of studies use different subject pools. Student samples may differ
from community members and CPR users in the crucial dimension of
the social norms that they share. Frey and Stutzer (2006) argue that
the level of crowding-out depends on existing norms of cooperation
and reciprocity. Vollan (2008) shows that the introduction of
controlling regulations produces stronger crowding-out of coopera-
tive behavior among groups with high levels of trust. The bulk of
evidence on crowding-in comes from subject pools linked by weak
norms of cooperation. The present study complements this literature
by bringing treatment designs typical of laboratory experiments to a
subject pool of actual CPR users.2
The empirical and theoretical literatures on crowding-out suggest
that intrinsically motivated individuals may be less pro-social when
decision environments signal in a strong and salient way the desired
behavior. In such cases “the individual will attribute the performing of
the [..] task to the external incentives”, while in their absence “the
individual would have attributed the execution of the task to the
intrinsic features of the task” (Fehr and Falk, 2002, 714). Non-
monetary and non-normative incentives, priming individuals to the
appropriate behavior, may have motivation crowding effects similar
to monetary and regulatory ones. Whether priming leads to
heterogeneous motivation crowding, depending on individual intrin-
sic motivation to behave pro-socially, is the main focus of this study.
Two testable predictions follow from the discussion of the
literature conducted here. First, priming on the approved behavior
will negatively affect pro-social choices of individuals with high
valuation of the CPR3 because the negative effect of priming on self-
image should be stronger for socially engaged individuals. Second,
priming on the approved behavior will affect pro-social choices
differently depending on whether one's donation is observed and on
who observes it. If behaving unselﬁshly has a positive signaling value
on one's moral qualities, then this value will vary depending on the
type of relationship between a player and those who observe her
choices. These predictions will be tested in the empirical analysis.
3. Experimental Setting and Design
3.1. Setting
The study took place in Bolivia, on the edge of the Andean
rainforest. Two communities were selected in the municipality of
Quirusillas, in the south-west of the Department of Santa Cruz.
Although only 5% of the municipal area is suitable for farming
activities, due to the presence of steep mountains, people practice
agriculture and livestock raising on 65% of the municipal land. Ninety
four percent of households own land, 21 ha on average in size (INE,
2001). Low productivity subsistence agriculture is the dominant
production system, monoculture is common and soil conservation
practices, such as crop rotation, are rarely adopted. Land clearing
occurs mainly due to the widespread practice of slash-and-burn
agriculture, since timber extraction for commercial purposes is not
frequent. Overall, overexploitation of land is associated with increas-
ing incidence of soil erosion and ﬂooding in the area (Plan de
Desarrollo Municipal, 2003).
The study area was identiﬁed through collaboration with a local
NGO, Fundacion Natura Bolivia (FN). Since 2003 FN has promoted
environmental conservation through the establishment of Payment
for Environmental Services schemes in Santa Cruz. At the time of the
project, FN was about to start work in the study area. Municipal
authorities were consulted to identify communities that suffered from
deforestation-related environmental problems. The shortlisted com-
munities were visited to assess the presence of communal land in
need of reforestation, its size and proximity to the water source.
Presence of communal land was necessary to ensure that participants
perceived the project as a common good. Proximity to a water source
was crucial to guarantee feasibility of the reforestation project. It is
important to note that trees planted along stream banks prevent soil
erosion and thus improve water quality.
The two villages that took part in the study are located along the
same valley, one at the feet of the mountains and the other at higher
elevation. The former is larger and closer to the municipal capital,
while the latter is smaller and more isolated. The two communities
are connected by a dirt road and the distance between them can be
covered in half an hour by car. Seventy eight individuals participated
to the experiment, which took place over two one-day sessions. One
member from each household, preferably the household head or the
spouse, was invited to the experiment several days in advance.
Attendance was around 80% downstream and nearly perfect up-
stream, thanks to the monetary compensation offered for participa-
tion, which minimized selection concerns.4
Table 1 presents basic characteristics of participants and of the two
communities. Participants are similar in terms of age, education and
gender, and of their behavior and opinions towards the environment.
They rely on the forest for ﬁrewood, timber, other forest products and
water. The belief that forest cover is linked to quality and quantity of
water is shared bymore than half of the participants, and about 70% of
them identify deforestation as the main threat to the environment.
The two communities differ in terms of infrastructural development
and environmental problems. Around half of participants' households
in the more remote upstream community rely on local streams for
domestic water supply, while virtually everyone downstream has
2 The decision to conduct the research in a ﬁeld setting presents both advantages
and disadvantages. It maximizes the relevance of the study for the design of CPR
management systems and ﬁlls a research gap. However, these beneﬁts come at the
cost of lower experimental control and higher levels of heterogeneity of the sample.
These advantages and disadvantages will be apparent in the discussion of the
experimental results.
3 This equals saying that crowding-in effects are expected to be stronger for less
motivated individuals.
4 Participants were given a show up fee equal to one day's wage (40 Bolivianos,
about 6 USD). Although the experiment and post-game interview took about two
hours, participants were required to wait both before and after play, in order to ensure
rigorous randomization across treatments and minimize contamination respectively.
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access to piped water within their homestead. Droughts and ﬂoods
are the main cause for the loss of harvest in the downstream and
upstream community respectively.5
Participants could contribute money to plant trees along the
community's water source. Native trees, commonly known as ceibo,6
were chosen for the reforestation project. Local biologists suggested
this type of tree for different reasons. First, its deep roots make it
effective for soil conservation. Second, ceibo would favor biodiversity
in the area, since an endangered species of parrots likes to feed on its
ﬂowers. Third, if planted at the time of the study, ceibo was likely to
survive requiring neither irrigation nor work on the part of com-
munity members. Finally, it has no commercial value and is planted
only for soil and water conservation. A local saying on ceibo claims
that it attracts the water.
In order to minimize uncertainty on the actual use of players'
contributions, tree seedlings were brought to the experiment sites.
Participants were informed that the trees would be planted the
following day. Since there was more than one water source in both
communities, it was agreed that the allocation of plants between
sources would be decided by participants at the time of planting. To
reduce the inﬂuence of self-interested motives on experimental
decisions, the possibility of being remunerated for planting the trees
was not mentioned.7 Results from the game were presented and
discussed in a meeting with community members the day following
the experiment. Participants to the meeting decided on the allocation
of the trees and were invited to plant them. Their remuneration was
agreed with local authorities.
This section has shown how the experiment was designed so as to
prevent the reforestation project from being a potential source of
income for participants. Contributions to the experiment should thus
be driven by the desire to contribute to the conservation of a common
resource.
3.2. Design
Each participant in the experiment decided howmuch to contribute
to a reforestation project from an endowment of 50 Bolivianos.8 The
possible choices ranged from 0 to 50 in intervals of 5 Bolivianos, the
amount needed to purchase and plant 2 trees. Each participant could
therefore purchase and plant up to 20 trees. The decision of whether to
contribute some unearned money for planting trees on public land
differs under important respects from farmers' resource-use decisions.
However, it induces a similar trade-off between certain, short term
private beneﬁts and uncertain, long term social costs. It is also similar to
actual conservation decisions taken by community members, such as
supplying labor or materials for the protection of springs. The
assumption behind this design choice is that contributions are
positively correlated with individual valuation of the reforestation
project in particular, and of environmental conservation in general. 9
The design has a between-subjects, four-by-one structure. Each
participant was randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups.
Relative to the control treatment (private treatment), the other three
conditions introduce different types of non-monetary, non-regulatory
priming on the socially approved behavior. The treatments are
inspired by designs used in the experimental literature to identify
5 The frequency of ﬂoods upstream is a consequence of the fact that land is very
steep there due to closeness with the mountains.
6 Erythrina crista-galli.
7 A failure to control for expectations about future labor income adds an
unobservable source of heterogeneity that should be orthogonal to treatment and
not bias results across experimental groups.
8 This amount is slightly larger than a day's wage, and corresponds to about 7 USD.
9 Beliefs on the appropriateness of the reforestation intervention, on the survival
probability of trees and on the private beneﬁts that could be gained from the project
vary across individuals and affect contributions within the experiment, but this should
not invalidate the basic assumption. Moreover, beliefs should not vary systematically
across treatments thanks to randomization.
Table 1
Characteristics of participants in the two communities taking part in the study: t-test for equal group means.
(1) Mean of [var] among participants
in the downstream community (n=48)
(2) Mean of [var] among participants
in the upstream community (n=30)
(3) P-value
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age 40.2 (2.168) 42.7 (2.920) .494⁎
Female (%) 47.9 (.073) 43.3 (.088) .210
Years of education 5.937 (.535) 5.517 (.531) .602
Has piped water (%) 97.9 (.021) 53.3 (.093) .000⁎⁎⁎
Has electricity (%) 52.1 (.073) 10 (.056) .000⁎⁎⁎
Owns land (%) 79.2 (.059) 86.7 (.063) .408
Owns livestock (%) 66.7 (.069) 53.3 (.092) .244
Beneﬁts from the forest (% who mentions the following)
Water quantity or quality 54.2 (.073) 50 (.093) .724
Firewood or timber 31.2 (.067) 36.6 (.089) .627
Extracts products from the forest (%) 77.1 (.061) 72.4 (.084) .650
Deforestation is main threat (%) 70.8 (.066) 76.7 (.085) .578
Main cause for loss of harvest in the past 3 years (% who mentions the following)
Drought 60.4 (.071) 43.3 (.092) .145
Flood 16.7 (.054) 46.7 (.093) .004⁎⁎
Community problems (% who mentions the following)
Water 70.8 (.066) 76.7 (.078) .578
Erosion 41.6 (.072) 36.6 (.089) .666
Social preferences
Community work 4.667 (1.105) 2.517 (.402) .145
Independence (%) 37.5 (.071) 30 (.085) .504
Note: Std. errors in parenthesis.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%
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drivers of pro-social behavior. They prime participants on the
appropriate conservation choice in different ways – giving informa-
tion on others' choices (information treatment), making decisions
public (public treatment) and introducing the possibility of punish-
ment (punishment treatment) respectively – each leveraging a
speciﬁc mechanism found to sustain social norms. 10 Each treatment
is described in detail below.
The design allows a comparison of choices under different
conditions, which I conduct in two stages. First, by considering each
treatment separately, I explore which mechanisms behind norm
compliance are relevant in this setting. Second, by pooling all forms of
priming together, I analyze the effect of priming on intrinsic
motivation. Survey questions on social values, cooperation, trust in
local institutions, knowledge and opinions on environmental issues
complement the experimental evidence and help identify factors
correlated with decisions within the game.
Table 2 tests the presence of statistically signiﬁcant differences
between members of different treatment groups using the Kruskal–
Wallis H test.11 Participants in different treatments do not differ
signiﬁcantly along any demographic characteristic, nor along any of
the variables that will be used in the empirical analysis.
The sessions proceeded as follows. As participants arrived, they
were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment groups, each of
which was seated in a separate waiting area. The order of treatments
was also randomized. Once the ﬁrst group ﬁnished, the second group
was called in, and so on. Each group was taken to a room, where the
experimenter read the instructions and explained the experimental
decision in detail. Participants then proceeded one by one to a second
room, where they made their decision in private. The experimenter
was present to make any clariﬁcations, ask comprehension questions
and assist illiterate participants with ﬁlling in the decision sheet.12
Participants capable of completing the decision sheet on their own
were left alone in the room to write down their contribution. When
the experimenter re-entered the room, he asked the participant to
guess the most frequent choice by people who had previously faced
the same decision. These steps were common to all treatments.
Participants in the private and information treatments the second
room at this point left and proceeded directly to be interviewed by an
enumerator. Participants in the public and punishment treatments
were taken to a third room, where they waited for all members of
their groups to make their choices. The speciﬁc features of each
treatment are as follows.
In the private treatment, the contribution choice was kept secret.
Each person assigned to this treatment was told that nobody, apart
from the researcher handing out the payments, would know her
contribution. This treatment isolates intrinsic valuation of the
reforestation project. When the amount given is unobservable,
intrinsic valuation should be its main determinant. Experiments in
the laboratory show that greater anonymity is associated with lower
contributions in dictator games (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). Since the
main objective of this study is analyzing the effect of external
incentives on conservation choices, relative to a situation where no
priming takes place, the contribution in the private treatment is used
here as the basic proxy of intrinsic motivation. This treatment serves
as a baseline and is the omitted category in all regressions in the data
analysis, which allowsme to directly observe the effect of the different
forms of priming relative to the case where no priming takes place.
In the information treatment, each participant was shown a card
and told that it reported the contribution of someone who had played
the game before.13 This information was given to participants just
before they made their choices, while alone with the experimenter.
This treatment primes participants on the appropriate behavior in
different ways: they learn the appropriate behavior by observing the
actions of others; their attention is focused on the existence of a norm;
and the observed contribution suggests what behavior is considered
as appropriate by other participants. Krupka and Weber (2009) refer
to these three channels as the informational, focusing and prescriptive
roles of social norms, respectively. In their study, which inspired this
treatment, they ﬁnd that individuals exhibit greater compliance with
Table 2
Randomization table: Kruskal–Wallis H test of between group differences across participants from both communities assigned to the four treatment groups.
(1) H-statistics (2) Probability that the groups were drawn
from the same chi-square distribution
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age 2.991 39.3
Female (%) 4.029 25.8
Years of education .569 90.3
Services and land use
Has piped water (%) 2.222 52.8
Owns land (%) 1.463 69.1
Owns livestock (%) 3.590 30.9
Main cause for loss of harvest in the past 3 years (% who mentions the following)
Drought 1.098 77.7
Flood .554 90.7
Social preferences
Community work .050 99.7
Independence (%) 1.378 71.1
Note: Column 1 shows the H-statistics, which represents the variance of the ranks among groups, with an adjustment for the number of ties, and is approximately chi-square
distributed. Column 2 gives the P-value corresponding to a chi-square equal to H, representing the probability of getting a particular value of H by chance if the null hypothesis, that
the groups are drawn from the same distribution, is true. The degrees of freedom of the chi-square distribution are the number of groups minus 1.
10 The labels given here to the experimental treatments – private, information, public
and punishment – are for exposition purposes only. No mention of such labels was
made during the experiment. Appendix 2 contains an English version of the
experimental instructions.
11 The Kruskal–Wallis test is a multiple sample generalization of the two-sample
Mann–Whitney rank sum test. Samples from different groups are pooled and ranked
in ascending order of magnitude. The ranks of observations from each group are
summed. The Kruskal–Wallis test tells the probability that the different groups rank-
sum distributions come from the same distribution. The small size of the sample
makes this non-parametric test preferable to parametric k-sample signiﬁcance tests.
12 Group members waiting to make their decisions remained in the ﬁrst room. There
they waited in the company of an experiment assistant, who made sure that they did
not talk to each other.
13 Results from a pilot test of the game were used to draw the decision shown to
participants in this treatment. The same contribution, equal to 35 Bolivianos, was
shown to all participants to this treatment.
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a normwhen they observe others doing so andwhen their attention is
focused on the existence of a norm.14
Participants in the public treatment were informed that they
would announce their contribution to others in their group. This
information was given to them while in the group and again when
alone with the experimenter. Group members made their choice in
private and then went to a third room. There they were asked to
announce their contribution to each other. Participants from other
treatment groups were not allowed to listen to the contribution
announcements. Experiments in the laboratory where behavior is
observable by others have been used to measure the effect of social
pressures on conformity with the norm (Andreoni and Bernheim,
2009). Pro-social behavior typically increases when decisions are
made public. The difference between private and public outcomes is
believed to capture the reputation effect of norm compliance. If
natural resource conservation sends positive signals on the type of
person one is, then this treatment should prime participants on the
appropriate behavior through the reputational effect of contributing
to reforestation.
The punishment treatment randomly assigned participants to the
role of Player 1 or of Player 2. Player 2s could, at a cost to themselves,
sanction choices by Player 1s that they believed to be socially
inappropriate. Player 2s payoffs within the game were not directly
affected by Player 1s' reforestation decisions. However, as Player 1s
and 2s were members of the same community, all of them would be
affected by the reforestation project outside the game context. The
impact of Player 1's contribution on Player 2's utility depended on the
latter's valuation of the reforestation project and preferences for
fairness.
Players in both roles made their choices in private. The procedure
for Player s mirrored the one for participants in the private treatment.
Player 2s were given an endowment of 25 Bolivianos15 and were
asked if they wanted to reduce their own winnings by 5 Bolivianos in
order to reduce Player 1's winnings by 10 Bolivianos, or if instead they
wanted to leave things as they were.16 Designs allowing for costly
punishment have been used in the laboratory to identify the role of
social sanctions in norm compliance. These studies show that the
possibility of being sanctioned increases pro-social behavior, and that
participants are willing to sacriﬁce some of their own endowment in
order to punish others, even if they are not directly affected by their
decisions (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). The introduction of the threat
of sanction is the mechanism through which this treatment primes
participants on the appropriate behavior.
The strategy method was used for Player 2s, so they took the
punishment decision for each possible contribution to the reforesta-
tion project. Participants knew before playing that they would be
randomly paired with another player. They also knew how the
combination of the decisions of Players 1 and 2 would determine each
person's winnings. The matching procedure was public and transpar-
ent, so as tomake clear to all that it was anonymous and random: each
participant's decision was placed in an envelope, and envelopes were
put in two boxes labeled 1 and 2 respectively. After all participants
had played, the group was taken to a third room where the
experiment assistant randomly paired each envelope from box 1 to
one envelope from box 2.
The decision to use the strategy method was inﬂuenced mainly by
the desire to make the methodology comparable to that used in
laboratory third-party punishment experiments (Fehr and Gaechter,
2000), and by logistical considerations which made the application of
the direct-response method in a ﬁeld setting extremely challenging
(Casari and Cason, 2009). The strategy method, while having the
advantage of allowing higher statistical depth in the analysis of
punishers' decisions, especially at the nodes that are rarely reached in
sequential play, may affect behavior relative to the direct-response
method. For instance, it could reduce the inﬂuence of emotions on
experimental choices. Whether the strategy method leads to different
choices than when participants respond to actual choices is still an
open question.17
The experiment also had a belief elicitation component. After
deciding how much to contribute to the reforestation project,
participants to all treatments were asked to guess what the majority
of players, who faced the same decision that they had just taken, had
contributed in previous sessions of the experiment. Correct guesses
were rewarded with an additional 10 Bolivianos. Elicited beliefs were
speciﬁc to the treatment each participant had been randomly
assigned. They are therefore expected to respond to the different
decision environments embodied in the treatments. The experimental
literature uses similar belief elicitation methodologies to identify the
social norms at work in speciﬁc decision setting. Krupka and Weber
(2008) show how elicited beliefs on average behavior respond to
changes in the decision environment. They believe this ﬁnding to
suggest that there are no absolute social norms, but that the socially
approved behavior is sensitive to the context. The empirical analysis
conducted in the next section tests the effect of experimental
treatments both on contributions and stated beliefs.
4. Experimental Results
This section is articulated in four parts. In the ﬁrst, differences in
contributions across sites and treatments are discussed. The presence
and direction of motivation crowding is tested in the second part,
where survey data are used to identify sources of heterogeneous
treatment effects. The third part uses dyadic data to test the social
image hypothesis, by exploring the relationship between social
distance and experimental decisions. Finally, the generalizability of
the results beyond the ﬁeld of environmental conservation is
discussed in the fourth part.
4.1. Experimental Results by Treatment and Community
Table 3 presents individual contributions to the reforestation
project (Column 1) and guesses of the majority's contribution among
14 The information treatment in this study combines the informational, focusing and
prescriptive channels and therefore does not allow disentangling the role of each one
in affecting experimental outcomes.
15 Equal to half of Player 1 s' endowment and worth about 3.5 USD.
16 A table with all possible combinations of payoffs was shown to the group: each
combination was explained to the participants using the word reduce instead of the
word punish.
17 The effect of the choice methodology used on subjects' behavior varies across
studies (Brandts and Charness, 2000; Casari and Cason, 2009; Oxoby and McLeish,
2004). Roth (1985) discusses the behavioral reasons behind such differences. For a
recent meta-study of the effect of strategy versus direct-response method, see Brandts
and Charness, 2009.
Table 3
Mean of experimental outcomes, by treatment group.
(1) Contribution
(Bolivianos)
(2) Guess of average contribution
to reforestation among others facing
same decision (Bolivianos)
Private treatment 22.5 20.71
(15.441) (9.579)
Information treatment 15.357 23.571
(10.278) (10.082)
Public treatment 22.5 20.5
(12.407) (10.748)
Punishment treatment 16 18.167
(12.276) (10.462)
Overall 19.365 20.192
(12.841) (10.302)
Number of Obs 63 78
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis.
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people facing the same decision (Column 2) on average by treatment.
Mean overall contribution is about 19.4 Bolivianos. Average contri-
bution is lowest in the Information treatment and highest in the
private and public treatments. Guesses of the most frequent
contribution are also sensitive to group assignment. In particular,
participants in the Information treatment display the highest guesses.
This is likely to be a consequence of the high contribution example
shown to them before their choice.
In order to test whether differences in outcomes across treatments
are signiﬁcant, Table 4 compares average contributions across pairs of
treatments, using a parametric and a non-parametric test. The t-test of
pairwise group differences (Columns 1 and 2) is almost never
signiﬁcant. This is to be expected, given the small group sizes. Column
3 and 4 show results from the Mann–Whitney test, more appropriate
with small samples. The probability of a randomly drawn contribution
from the ﬁrst group being higher than a randomly drawn contribution
from the second group is reported in Column 3. Column 4 shows the
p-value with which the null hypothesis of equal distributions is
rejected. Only the difference between the Information and the Public
treatment is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
On average, the effect on giving of the information and
punishment treatments relative to the private one is negative. This
result, though not statistically signiﬁcant, hints to the negligible role
played by information and social sanctions in the decision of
contributing to reforestation. The reputational and sanctioning
channels have been found to sustain norm compliance in other
contexts, but do not appear to be at work in the study setting. This fact
may suggest the absence of an established norm of behavior for
environmental conservation. This conclusion is supported by the
results on giving under the public treatment. When public, donations
are on average equal to those in the private treatment. More
interestingly, average giving in the public treatment is the same
across communities, a possible result of the presence of a norm for
contributing to village projects in general, rather than to environ-
mental conservation in particular.
Experimental outcomes clearly differ across communities. Figs. 1
and2 show individual and average contributions by treatment in the
two study communities. Downstream, overall average contribution is
equal to 14 Bolivianos. Contributions in the private, information and
punishment treatments are not statistically different from each other.
Participants in the public treatment are the highest contributors in the
community: the t-test of the difference in average contribution
between the public and the remaining three treatments downstream
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. For the upstream community the picture
is different: contributions are higher than downstream in all
treatments but the public one, and differences across treatments are
never signiﬁcant. Overall average contribution upstream is of 24.8
Bolivianos, nearly half of the total endowment. Although a formal test
is not possible because only two villages took part in the study, this
picture is consistent with the presence of a negative correlation
between existing norms of cooperation and motivation crowding:
while priming has no effect on donation where initial cooperation is
high, it signiﬁcantly increases contributions, at least in one of form,
where cooperation is low.
Next, I use regression analysis and consider four experimental
outcomes: contribution amounts, guesses on the majority's contribu-
tion, the probability of giving above the average contribution in the
community and the probability of giving above one's guess. The ﬁrst
two dependent variables are the two decisions taken by participants
in the experiment. The third dependent variable gives a measure of
individual cooperation relative to the community average, while the
fourth captures the probability that one contributes above what she
believes to be the socially approved level.
Regressions in Table 5 include interactions between treatment
dummies and community ﬁxed effects:
yi = β1 + β2Treatmenti + β3Commi + β4Treatmenti4Commi + εi ð1Þ
where yi denotes each of the four experimental outcomes. The private
group is used as the control group relative to which the effect of
priming is measured. This choice is maintained throughout the
empirical session.
Treatment dummies do not appear to be signiﬁcant. Insigniﬁcant
treatment effects are likely to be an unavoidable consequence of the
small sample problem that affects this study. The results conﬁrm the
differences in treatment effects across communities suggested by
Fig. 1. A pattern similar to that outlined for contribution amounts can
be detected for other experimental outcomes. Beliefs on average con-
tributions are higher upstream than downstream by 4.6 Bolivianos.18
Even so, members of the upstream community contribute more than
their believed average contribution 72% of the time. The correspond-
ing ﬁgure is 55% downstream. Participants upstream contribute more,
have higher beliefs on the appropriate contribution level and aremore
likely to give above such level.
The different behavior of participants living upstream and
downstream does not appear to be motivated by different socio-
demographic characteristics across locations. Table 6 presents results
from regressions of experimental outcomes on age, education and
gender,19 controlling for community:
yi = β1 + β2Agei + β3Educationi + β4Femalei + β5Commi + εi ð2Þ
Regression coefﬁcients for each socio-demographic variable
appear to be rarely signiﬁcant. Education is positively correlated
with outcomes, while the opposite holds for age. They appear to be
Table 4
Pairwise differences in contribution across treatments: t-test for equal group means and Mann–Whitney non-parametric test.
T-test Mann–Whitney test
(1) Difference in mean contribution (1st group
mean contrib−2nd group mean contrib)
(2) P-value (3) Prob (contrib. from 1st group≥contrib.
from 2nd group)
(4) P-value
Private versus information 7.143 .161⁎ .622 .263
Private versus public 0 1.000 .48 .846
Private versus punishment 6.5 .218⁎⁎ .61 .314
Information versus public −7.143 .086⁎⁎⁎ .32 .076
Information versus punishment −.643 .880 .49 .891
Public versus punishment 6.5 .133 .69 .058
Note: Column 3 reports the probability of a randomly drawn value from the ﬁrst group to be greater than a randomly drawn value from the second group.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
18 23 Bolivianos on average upstream against 18.4 Bolivianos downstream: the
difference is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
19 The dependent variables are absolute amount contributed (Column 1), dummy
equal to 1 if contribution is above the community average (Column 2), beliefs on
average contribution (Column 3)and contribution above belief (Column 4).
2089G. d'Adda / Ecological Economics 70 (2011) 2083–2097
Author's personal copy
signiﬁcant only for contribution levels. The female indicator variable is
negatively correlated with all outcomes but one. The upstream
community dummy remains positive and signiﬁcant even after
controlling for individual characteristics.
A second potential explanation for the differences in experimental
outcomes across villages concerns the expected returns from the
reforestation project. The intervention could have been perceived as
more beneﬁcial and useful in the upstream community.20 Indeed,
survey data conﬁrm this claim. Upstream, 60% of participants believed
that the project would be good for the environment and the
community. The corresponding ﬁgure is 37.5% downstream. Since
participants were asked for an opinion on the reforestation project
after choosing their contribution, these data can at most be suggestive.
While one can argue that individuals downstream did not contribute
because they thought that the project was not useful, the opposite
claim is equally plausible, i.e. that individuals downstream said that
the project was not useful because they had not contributed much to
it.21
A third possible explanation of community level differences in
outcomes focuses on the relative population sizes in the two villages.
Population downstream is about twice as large as upstream. Ceteris
paribus, smaller groups are found to be more effective at ensuring
participation in common good provision (Ostrom, 1990), as free-
riding incentives increase with group size.
Although the data available do not allow distinguishing between
these alternative explanations, it seemed nonetheless important to
me to highlight the presence of heterogeneity across villages and
discuss its potential causes. While I am not able to explain community
level differences, I can explore sources of heterogeneity in giving and
in treatment effects at the individual level. This will be the topic of the
next subsection.
4.2. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
This subsection looks at sources of heterogeneous effects of
treatments. The goal is to test the ﬁrst behavioral prediction made
in Section 2, i.e. that priming on the approved behavior negatively
affects pro-social choices if one has a high valuation of the common
good. In order to do this, I use a variable equal to 1 if a participant was
assigned to the Information, Public and Punishment treatments, and
0 otherwise. This dummy variable identiﬁes situations where some
form of priming on the socially approved behavior takes place, as
opposed to the Private treatment, where no priming occurs. The
priming dummy is interacted with proxies for intrinsic motivation in
order to test the motivation-crowding hypothesis. Two variables are
considered: civic engagement, captured by the number of days of
community work performed over the previous year; and individual-
ism, revealed by the belief that independence is one of the most
important qualities to teach a child. These two variables reﬂect two
correlated, but not overlapping, dimensions of social preferences.22
Community work days are a common practice in the region under
study. Village members regularly join forces to work on common
projects, such as cleaning the square or ﬁlling holes in the road.
Participation to community work days is not compulsory, but
noncompliance is subject to social disapproval.23 Survey data show
that participation in community work is positively correlated with the
number of organizations active in the community known, and with
the probability of having helped others in the previous month.24 I
therefore use participation in community work as a proxy for civic
engagement and intrinsic valuation of the common good.
On the contrary, participants who think that independence is one
of the main qualities to teach a child are less likely to be members of
community organizations and to take part in community meetings.25
The use of this variable as a proxy of individualism is justiﬁed by
research in the ﬁeld of social psychology. Hofstede (2001) deﬁnes
individualism in terms of independent self-construct, which denotes a
state where an individual views himself as ‘an independent,
autonomous person’ (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). In a study
speciﬁcally aimed at identifying indicators of individualism, Gustavs-
son (2008) ﬁnds this particular variable, taken from the World Values
Survey, to be a signiﬁcant proxy.
First of all, I look at how the two intrinsic motivation proxies are
correlatedwith experimental outcomes. Table 7 reports regressions of
the four experimental outcomes on community work days and the
independence dummy, controlling for community ﬁxed effects. The
following regressions are estimated:
yi = β1 + β2Commworki + β3Individi + β4Commi + εi ð3Þ
20 This would be the case if planting trees near the community mitigated negative
environmental externalities more in one place than in the other. If much of the
contamination of the water occurred before the stream reached the downstream
community, for instance, reforestation of a piece of land within the community's
boundaries would only result in minor improvements in water quality.
21 More formally, psychologists say that individuals tend to justify their own choices
ex-post, both to themselves and to others, in ways that preserve their self-image (Fehr
and Falk, 2002).
22 The pairwise correlation coefﬁcient is −18% and not statistically signiﬁcant.
23 A small survey implemented in a neighboring municipality by the local partner,
FN, supports this claim.
24 Individuals in the top 2 deciles in terms of participation to community work
mention on average 32% more institutions who have been active in the village. They
are also 25% more likely to have lent money or things to neighbors or to have helped
strangers over the previous month. One-sided t-tests are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
25 They are 15% less likely to be members of the Organizacion Territorial de Base
(OTB), the main institution at the village level; and 17% less likely to attend
community meetings. One-sided t-tests are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Fig. 1. Individual contributions by community.
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Civic engagement is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with all
experimental outcomes. Individuals who are more engaged in
community work give more, are more likely to give above the average
in their village, have higher beliefs on others' contributions and are
more likely to give above what they believe to be the norm. The
opposite holds for individualism, which is negatively correlated with
experimental outcomes, signiﬁcantly only for the probability of
contributing above the community average.
Next I consider how civic engagement and individualism, in
turn, interact with the priming embodied in experimental treatments.
Table 8 shows results from regressions of experimental outcomes
on the priming dummy, community work days and the interaction
between them:
yi = β1 + β2Primingi + β3Commworki + β4Primingi
 Commworki + β5Commi + εi ð4Þ
The positive correlation between community work and all
experimental outcomes is conﬁrmed. The coefﬁcients on the
interaction term are positive in all but one case. The net effect of
priming, computed by summing the coefﬁcients on the priming
dummy and the interaction term, is negative with one exception, the
probability of contributing above the norm. Priming negatively affects
behavior of participants with high valuation of the good of the
community. While not statistically signiﬁcant, this result is consistent
with the prediction of negative motivation crowding of treatments for
individuals intrinsically motivated to behave pro-socially.
Table 9 shows results from a similar exercise, only community
work is replaced by the independence dummy:
yi = β1 + β2Primingi + β3Individi + β4Primingi
 Individi + β5Commi + εi ð5Þ
Individualism is negatively correlated with experimental out-
comes. Coefﬁcients on interaction terms are positive, large in size and
Table 5
Regressions of experimental outcomes on treatment dummies, community and interaction of treatment dummies and community.
(1) Contribution (Bolivianos) (2) Prob (Contribution≥average
village contribution)
(3) Guess of average contribution among
others facing same decision (Bolivianos)
(4) Prob (Contribution≥guess)
Information treatment −7.222 −0.275 2.222 −0.214
(6.166) (0.210) (4.867) (0.230)
Public treatment 4.167 0.265 1.556 0.187
(7.279) (0.226) (4.853) (0.155)
Punishment treatment −7.333 −0.152 −4.194 0.245
(6.104) (0.221) (4.469) (0.133)⁎
Information upstream 0.222 0.079 1.778 −0.877
(8.851) (0.442) (7.288) (0.045)⁎⁎⁎
Public upstream −11.667 −0.431 −4.556 −0.950
(8.882) (0.168)⁎⁎ (6.536) (0.027)⁎⁎⁎
Punishment upstream 3.333 −0.231 5.194 −0.894
(9.886) (0.299) (5.687) (0.034)⁎⁎⁎
Upstream 11.667 0.472 3.556 0.962
(6.738)⁎ (0.257)⁎ (4.280) (0.025)⁎⁎⁎
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.19
Number of Obs 63 63 78 63
Note: Private is the omitted category among treatment groups. Upstream dummy equal to 1 for the upstream community and to 0 for the downstream community. Marginal Effects
reported for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Fig. 2. Average contributions by treatment and community.
2091G. d'Adda / Ecological Economics 70 (2011) 2083–2097
Author's personal copy
signiﬁcant in 3 out of 4 cases. In particular, there is a positive and
signiﬁcant correlation between contributions and priming for indi-
vidualistic participants. The net effect of priming is also positive for
this type of individuals across outcomes, with the exception of the
probability of contributing above the norm. Comparing Tables 8 and 9
suggests that priming indeed has a different effect depending on
individuals' intrinsic valuation of the common good: while it does not
seem to affect highly motivated individuals, it crowds-in pro-social
behavior of individualistic ones. This ﬁnding mirrors Gneezy and
Rustichini's (2000) results on the effect of incentives to exercise.
The most direct evidence of heterogeneous motivation-crowding
effects of priming is shown in Table 10. There, contribution amount is
regressed on the priming dummy, the civic engagement and inde-
pendence proxies and the interaction between the priming dummy
with the latter two:
Contributioni = β1+β2Primingi+β3Commworki+β4Individi
+β5Primingi  Commworki+β6Primingi  Individi
+β7Commi+εi
ð6Þ
This regression uses a different proxy of civic engagement: a
variable equal to 1 if individual participation in community work is in
the top 2 deciles. This change should make coefﬁcients more
comparable across regressors and allow a cleaner identiﬁcation of
intrinsically motivated individuals.
The coefﬁcients on the main effect of community work and
independence conﬁrm the results presented above: more socially
engaged individuals contribute more, while the opposite holds for
more individualistic participants. Experimental treatments have a
negative impact on socially engaged individuals' contributions26 and a
positive impact on individualistic participants' contributions. Focus-
ing attention on the socially approved behavior has opposite effects
depending on an individual's pro-social preferences. These results
echo ﬁndings from the literature on the impact of monetary and
regulatory incentives and support the claim that non-monetary and
non-regulatory incentives generate similar heterogeneous motivation
crowding effects. The next subsection attempts to test onemechanism
through which this effect may act.
4.3. Social Image and Experimental Outcomes
In this subsection I test the claim that external incentives crowd-
out intrinsic motivation to behave pro-socially through their effect on
social image. An implication of such claim is that one's pro-social
behavior should respond to its observability and to the social distance
of those observing one's choices. By rectangularizing the individual
level dataset, I can look at the relationship between experimental
choices of pairs of players, the type of relationship between them and
their relative treatment assignment. This analysis uses dyadic
regressions (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007) and considers two
dependent variables: the absolute value of the difference between
player i and j's contributions to the reforestation project; and the
average between player i and j's contributions. The former captures
similarity of two participants' choices. The latter summarizes the
pair's level of pro-social behavior.
The inﬂuence of social distance on these outcomes is tested using
two proxies of social links between participants. The ﬁrst is a dummy
equal to 1 if i and j are relatives, i.e. they share the same surname. The
second is the number of community associations which i and j are
both members of. These variables are imperfect proxies of two
different types of social links. The former is correlated to closeness
between two individuals in the realm of their private life. The latter
approximates the intensity of interaction between two individuals in
the public sphere. The assumption made here is that family relation-
ships are less salient to the experimental decision than relationships
in the public sphere. If so, the negative impact on social image of a
selﬁsh choice will be lower if observed by relatives than by co-
members in community organizations. To test this claim, the two
social link proxies are interacted with a dummy variable equal to 1 if
players i and j are in the same public treatment group:
yij = β1 + β2Samepubij + β3Relij + β4Samepubij
 Relij + β5Commi + εi ð7Þ
yij = β1 + β2Samepubij + β3Sameassocij + β4Samepubij
Sameassocij + β5Commi + εi
ð8Þ
Table 11 presents dyadic regression results.27 The dependent
variable in Columns 1 and 2 is the absolute value of the difference
between i and j's contributions. The dependent variable in Column 3
and 4 is the average of i and j's contributions. Columns 1 and 3 regress
pairs' outcomes on the dummy for i and j being relatives, the dummy
for i and j being in the same public treatment group, and their
interaction. Regressions in Columns 2 and 4 replace the relative
dummy with the association co-membership variable.
26 The coefﬁcient on the interaction term is not signiﬁcant.
27 To correct for correlation between observations, we use the standard error formula
proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) for dyadic regressions. Individual
characteristics feature in dyadic regressions in two forms: the absolute value of the
difference between i and j's characteristic; and the sum of i and j's characteristics
(Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007).
Table 6
Regressions of experimental outcomes on demographic characteristics and community dummy.
(1) Contribution (Bolivianos) (2) Prob (Contribution≥average
village contribution)
(3) Guess of average contribution among
others facing same decision (Bolivianos)
(4) Prob (Contribution≥guess)
Female −1.094 −0.005 1.093⁎ −0.108
(2.882) (0.131) (2.415) (0.129)
Age −0.159 −0.007 −0.046 −0.006
(0.077)⁎⁎ (0.005) (0.057) (0.004)
Years of education 0.132 0.013 0.126 −0.002
(0.042)⁎⁎⁎ (0.015) (0.033)⁎⁎⁎ (0.003)
Upstream 9.912 0.308 5.327 0.165
(3.183)⁎⁎⁎ (0.133)⁎⁎ (2.402)⁎⁎ (0.128)
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.19 0.13 0.08 0.05
Number of Obs 63 63 78 63
Note: Community dummy equal to 1 for the upstream community and to 0 for the downstream community. Marginal Effects reported for discrete change of dummy variable from
0 to 1. Robust standard errors.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Columns 1 and 2 show that individuals who are related or interact
with each other more often in community organizations choose closer
contribution levels. The interaction terms have different signs in the
two regressions. Being observed by a relative rather than by a co-
member of community associations appears to have opposite effects
on the degree of similarity between one's choice and that of the
observer. Individuals who interact with each other more frequently in
their public life tend to choose closer contribution levels when
assigned to the same public treatment group (although this
correlation is not signiﬁcant). On the contrary, in the same situation
relatives display signiﬁcantly larger differences in contributions.
Columns 3 and 4 show the effect of social links and publicity of
decision on a pair's average contribution. Relatives appear to give less
on average when they are in the same public treatment group than
when they are in other treatment groups.
These results may be explained by endogenous sorting of
individuals with similar traits into the same organization or family
through marriage.28 Indeed, Table 11 shows that, when individuals
are relatives or belong to the same associations, their contribution
levels are closer. This is true across treatments. Endogenous sorting
does not explain, however, the difference of the sign for the
interaction terms across regressions. When decisions are public,
contributions of pairs of relatives are less homogeneous. The opposite
holds when the pair is formed by individuals who are members of the
same associations.29
This difference can be interpreted in terms of the social image costs
of different decisions. There is a cost in contributing an amount
different from what one expects others to give. The different signs of
interaction terms coefﬁcients hint to the fact that this social cost is
lower between individuals who interact in the private than in the
public sphere. Overall, dyadic regression results are consistent with
contribution decisions being affected by their costs in terms of social
image. I now turn to the question of generalizability of these results
beyond the scope of the experiment presented here.
4.4. Environmental-Speciﬁc Versus General Pro-Social Preferences
Earlier in this section I observed that experimental giving is
positive and fairly constant across treatments. This indicates the
presence of social preferences prescribing positive contributions. Such
preferences could be speciﬁc to environmental conservation, or they
could instead be pro-social preferences towards helping the commu-
nity, with natural resources simply acting as a conduit. This sub-
section presents arguments in support of the latter interpretation.
Environmental degradation is a community problem: 73% of
participants rate water-related problems as one of the main issues
in their community. The reforestation interventions could have been
perceived by participants as a generic project addressing community
problems. Unfortunately the experimental design, by focusing on a
unique type of intervention, does not allow comparing contribution
patterns across different community projects. However, the presence
of general pro-social preferences towards helping the community is
suggested by participants' behavior in the Public treatment. I observed
earlier how the only group experiencing signiﬁcant treatment effects
is the Public one in the downstream community. The Public treatment
is also the only one resulting in the same average contribution across
communities. Such uniformity might derive from the presence of a
standard contribution rule for public projects in both communities. It
is unlikely that previous reforestation projects contributed to the
formation of such rule. No reforestation activities of the kind
presented here had ever taken place in the area.30 On the contrary,
members of both communities meet regularly to decide contributions
to common projects. The practice of community work, as seen earlier
in the section, is also widespread.
Another argument in favor of the generalizability of the results
focuses on the lack of correlation between experimental outcomes and
proxies of environmental valuation. The survey administered to
participants included questions on importance given to the environ-
ment in general and forests in particular; perception of environmental
threats; reforestation conducted on own land; and loss of income due
to environmental shocks. Table 12 shows how none of these variables is
signiﬁcantly correlated with experimental outcomes. Proxies of more
general social preferences, such as civic engagement and individualism,
show more signiﬁcant correlation patterns with behavior in the game.
Finally, the results on experimental punishment appear to be due
to general preferences for fairness rather than to speciﬁc preferences
for reforestation. Player 2s sanctioned Player 1s 70% of the times for
contributing less than half of the endowment, but only 21% of the
times otherwise (Fig. 3). This result can be driven by a desire to punish
norm violators, or by spiteful preferences, i.e. by “the desire to reduce
another's material payoff for the mere purpose of increasing one's
relative payoff” (Fehr et al., 2008, 494). Fig. 4 is consistent with the
presence of inequality aversion: sanctions start decreasing for
contributions above the amount considered the norm for reforesta-
tion contributions, which is 20 Bolivianos, but the largest drop in
28 Similar preferences within the family could be observed even in the absence of
endogenous sorting. For instance, they could be due to genetic factors.
29 Table A1 shows that these results are robust to the inclusion of participants' age,
gender and education level. Obviously, this is only marginally reassuring. If people sort
on their propensity to be communal, and this trait is imperfectly proxied by age,
gender and education, these results do not rule out endogeneity of association
membership.
30 The only reforestation project, which was mentioned to us, was conducted by the
Municipal government about 10 years ago. It consisted in planting pine trees along the
slope of the mountain near the upstream village for commercial purposes.
Table 7
Regressions of experimental outcomes on days of community work and individualism proxy.
(1) Contribution (Bolivianos) (2) Prob (Contribution≥average
village contribution)
(3) Guess of average contribution among
others facing same decision (Bolivianos)
(4) Prob (Contribution≥guess)
Community work 0.743 0.036 0.198 0.033
(0.146)⁎⁎⁎ (0.019)⁎ (0.091)⁎⁎ (0.016)⁎⁎
Independence −4.140 −0.247 −2.422 −0.154
(3.170) (0.131)⁎ (2.509) (0.133)
Upstream 9.809 0.286 4.246 0.184
(2.997)⁎⁎⁎ (0.133)⁎⁎ (2.398)⁎ (0.124)
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.29 0.13 0.06 0.08
Number of Obs 62 62 77 62
Note: Community work denotes the number of days of community work that the respondent did over the previous 12 months. Independence is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent
mentioned independence among the 3 most important qualities to teach a child. Community dummy equal to 1 for the upstream community and to 0 for the downstream
community. Marginal Effects reported for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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punishment occurs around 25 Bolivianos, i.e. the contribution amount
at which Player 1s would go home with the same winnings as Player
2s (Fig. 4).
The evidence presented here, although not conclusive, supports
the idea that general social preferences, rather than speciﬁc norms
concerning the environment, are at work in the experimental setting.
This speaks in favor of the generalizability of the results beyond the
speciﬁc intervention conducted in this study.
5. Conclusions
This study uses an artefactual ﬁeld experiment centered on a
reforestation project to analyze social values for CPR conservation.
Focusing attention on the social norm increases altruistic choices of
selﬁsh individuals. The opposite holds among participants with high
valuation of the common good. The results from dyadic regressions
suggest that motivation crowding occurs through the effect of external
incentives on social image. Experimental results, though of limited
statistical signiﬁcance due to the small sample, are nonetheless valuable
and justify a series of considerations and avenues for further enquiry.
The study identiﬁes factors correlated with contributions to a
community project. These factors proxy civic engagement and
altruism in general, rather than environmental valuation in particular.
This makes the ﬁndings from this study speak both to the literature on
CPRmanagement and to the literature on other-regarding preferences
more in general. Research on motivation crowding-out shows how
Table 8
Regressions of experimental outcomes on the priming dummy, days of community work and interaction between the priming dummy and days of community work.
(1) Contribution (Bolivianos) (2) Prob (Contribution≥average
village contribution)
(3) Guess of average contribution among
others facing same decision (Bolivianos)
(4) Prob (Contribution≥guess)
Priming −5.134 −0.260 −1.090 0.040
(4.339) (0.176) (2.994) (0.187)
Community work 0.591 0.011 0.160 0.047
(0.163)⁎⁎⁎ (0.008) (0.116) (0.032)
Priming community work 0.697 0.045 0.178 −0.021
(0.616) (0.022)⁎⁎ (0.324) (0.037)
Upstream 10.263 0.294 4.483 0.185
(2.925)⁎⁎⁎ (0.132)⁎⁎ (2.398)⁎ (0.121)
Number of Obs 62 62 77 62
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.287 0.122 0.055 0.065
Note: Priming is a dummy equal to 1 if a participant is in the Information, Public and Punishment treatment, 0 if she is in the Private treatment. Community work denotes the number
of days of community work that the respondent did over the previous 12 months. Community dummy equal to 1 for the upstream community and to 0 for the downstream
community. Marginal Effects reported for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 9
Regression of the priming dummy, individualism proxy and interaction between treatment dummies and individualism proxy.
(1) Contribution (Bolivianos) (2) Prob (Contribution≥average
village contribution)
(3) Guess of average contribution among
others facing same decision (Bolivianos)
(4) Prob (Contribution≥guess)
Priming −5.279 −0.123 −2.122 0.004
(4.552) (0.170) (2.964) (0.166)
Independence −13.997 −0.966 −13.758 −0.105
(5.144)⁎⁎⁎ (0.015)⁎⁎⁎ (3.373)⁎⁎⁎ (0.376)
Priming independence 11.242 0.988 12.189 −0.045
(6.071)⁎ (0.005)⁎⁎⁎ (4.251)⁎⁎⁎ (0.401)
Upstream 8.407 0.219 3.981 0.164
(3.173)⁎⁎ (0.125)⁎ (2.427) (0.123)
Number of Obs 63 63 78 63
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.189 0.103 0.079 0.04
Note: Priming is a dummy equal to 1 if a participant is in the Information, Public and Punishment treatment, 0 if she is in the Private treatment. Independence is a dummy equal to 1 if
the respondent mentioned independence among the 3 most important qualities to teach a child. Community dummy equal to 1 for the upstream community and to 0 for the
downstream community. Marginal Effects reported for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 10
Regression of contributions on the priming dummy, being in the top 2 deciles in terms
of community work done, individualism proxy, and interaction between priming and
community work/individualism proxy.
(1) Contribution (Bolivianos)
Priming −5.539⁎
(4.042)
Community work 22.209
(7.933)⁎⁎⁎
Priming community work −7.526
(9.839)
Independence −22.791
(7.933)⁎⁎⁎
Priming independence 20.788
(8.495)⁎⁎
Upstream 9.511
(2.874)⁎⁎⁎
Number of Obs 63
R-squared 0.359
Note: Community work is a dummy equal to 1 if participant is in the top 2 deciles of the
distribution of days of community work done over the past 12 months. Independence is
a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent mentioned independence among the 3 most
important qualities to teach a child. Community dummy equal to 1 for the upstream
community and to 0 for the downstream community. Marginal Effects reported for
discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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the introduction of monetary rewards or regulatory sanctions can in
some settings reduce pro-social behavior. I claim here that even non-
monetary external incentives, by reducing the signaling value of pro-
social decisions, can have similar effects. This ﬁnding goes against the
claim, based on conventional experiments, that priming leads to
crowding-in of pro-social behavior and highlights the risk of gener-
alizing the results from laboratory experiments to infer behavior of
actual resource users.
Further empirical work may be worthwhile to test the generaliz-
ability of the results. Generalizability should be investigated along two
dimensions. First, by conducting similar experiments on a larger scale,
the empirical relevance of non-monetary and non-regulatory incentives
on motivation crowding could be assessed on a more representative
sample. Second, by varying the type of project funded by participants'
donation, similar experiments could be used to detect the presence of
conservation-speciﬁc norms and disentangle their effect from that of
norms regulating local public good contributions more in general.
It is commonly believed that regulations and monetary incentives
are needed to overcome the incentive problems in common resource
use. The crowding-out literature suggests, on the contrary, that
external incentives may ultimately be counterproductive. This study
ﬁnds that the most effective approach may depend on the initial
presence of civic values, with external incentives being more effective
in settings where intrinsic motivation is low, while solutions
generated and owned by the community may be preferable where
individuals share civic values and social norms of cooperation.
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Appendix A. Dyadic Regressions
TableA1. Dyadic regressions of experimental outcomes on social link
and group assignment, controlling for demographic characteristics.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Note: The dependent variable is the difference between i and j's
contributions in Column 1 and 2, and the average between i and j's
contributions in Column 3 and 4. “i–j same public group” is a dummy
equal to 1 if i and j assigned to the same public treatment group.
Columns 1 and 3 control for family relationship between i and j: “i–j
relatives” is a dummy equal to 1 if i and j are relatives. Column 2 and 4:
“i–j co-members in associations” is a dummy equal to 1 if i and j are
members of the same community association(s). Marginal effects
reported for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's correction in
parenthesis.
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